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Irrigation can have a significant negative impact on the environment. Irrigation 
impacts contribute a significant portion to the estimated forty six million dollar cost 
per annum of salinity in the Murray River, Australia. Policies available to regulators 
include externality taxes and levies. In 2002 the Victorian Government introduced a 
system of salinity levies in the irrigation regions of Sunraysia, northern Victoria. 
These levies differ from typical taxes because they also introduce trade barriers 
between certain locations. These trade barriers may increase the cost of reducing 
salinity. We use experiments to compare the salinity levy with trade barriers to an 
alternative salinity tax which removes the trade barriers and replaces them with a 
‘large’ tax relative to other geographic zones. Our results show that the salinity tax 
reduces the cost of salinity interception by the government by twenty five percent as 
compared to the salinity levy. We observe water prices do not increase when 
regulation is introduced, this may be because the introduction of taxes and levies 
encourages buyers to act more aggressively preventing sellers from extracting surplus 
on trades. Further, the introduction of regulation does not increase variability in 
average outcomes for these markets. 
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The export of pollutants from non-point sources is a significant problem in 
watersheds internationally.  The United States Environmental Protection Agency 
reports that agricultural non-point sources impact 48% of impaired rivers nationally 
(EPA, 2000).
1 In the Murray Darling Basin in Australia, irrigation practices contribute 
a significant portion to the estimated $46 million per annum cost of salinity (MDBC, 
1999). Regulatory policy mechanisms have often excluded non-point sources because 
identification is impossible or prohibitively expensive.
2 Recent advances in hydrology 
modelling have however improved knowledge about the cause and effects between 
production and water quality, making it possible to estimate the relationships between 
production practices and external environmental impacts. This allows regulators to 
use point-source policies in some non-point source situations.
3 The Sunraysia region 
of the Murray Darling Basin is one such example. Salinity impact zoning 
commissioned by the Victorian Government, divides the river into five separate zones 
such that irrigation contributions to salinity concentrations at the end of system 
monitoring point can be estimated based on location and water use volume (SKM, 
2001).
4 Table 1 reports the salinity impact zones and salinity concentration impacts.   
Once the regulators obtain information about the impact of irrigation practices of 
different sources, on salinity, they can consider different regulatory policies to reduce 
their impact. Market based instruments, which include taxes/levies, are one type of 
policy mechanism available to regulators. These mechanisms equalise private 
                                                             
1 Impaired rivers are those in which the water quality is too poor to support the designated beneficial 
uses. Designated uses include, drinking water, swimming or the survival of aquatic species. Further 
information can be found at www.epa.gov 
2 Beavis and Walker, 1983; Oates, 1995; and Shortle and Horan, 2001, discuss the difficulty of 
attributing control responsibility to non-point source emissions. 
3 Shortle and Horan, 2001 survey this literature and provide a good discussion about the relationship 
between production practices and their environmental impact.   3
marginal control costs across different polluters. Hence economic instruments such as 
taxes can allocate control responsibility at least cost (Tietenberg, 2001).
5  The 
Victorian Government, in April 2002, introduced a new system of salt impact levies in 
the Sunraysia region in the Victorian Mallee (SRWA, 2002). This region is a 
collection of irrigation districts and private irrigators that are located along the Murray 
River from Nyah to the South Australian border. Water trade in the region is very 
active with approximately 46000 net megalitres of permanent water licences traded 
into the region over the last decade (DNRE, 2001).
6 While the increase in water use 
has supported growth in the region, it also increases salt concentrations in the river.
7  
In this policy only buyers pay the levy; sellers of water incur no levy on sales. 
Furthermore, the levy is only imposed upon buyers who buy water from lower impact 
zones. In other words this policy creates a disincentive for water trades that increase 
salinity concentrations but no incentive for water trades that decrease salinity 
concentrations. Irrigators located in the 'High Impact Zone' (HIZ) can only buy water 
from sellers also located in the HIZ. Irrigators located in the ‘Low Impact Zones’ 
(LIZ) 1 to 4 can purchase water from sellers in any impact zone but must pay a salt 
levy per unit of water traded if they buy water from a lower impact zone (SRWA, 
2002). Table 2 reports the salinity levies as implemented in the Sunraysia region. 
The levy imposed in this region differs from standard externality taxes that are 
discussed in theory. Firstly, the tax is on the input (water) and not on the externality 
                                                                                                                                                                          
4 Within each zone the interactions between irrigation and salt concentrations in the river are 
homogenous, and each property is located in one zone (only) for the purposes of the levy (SRWA, 
2002). 
5 Tradable pollution permits is an alternative instrument using economic incentives to regulate the 
environment.   
6 A permanent water right transfers the freehold property right to the owner. Temporary water rights, 
transfer a lease for the water for a pre-determined period (usually one irrigation season). Temporary 
trade accounts for approximately 3 to 8 percent of total water licences held in the region (DNRE, 
2001). Permanent water rights have been used in this experiment as salinity can take up to 30years to 
manifest itself in the river. Permanent rights therefore seem the most appropriate right to model as they 
are held for longer periods of time. 
7 Excess water can enter the groundwater system via vertical drainage; depending on soil type, gradient 
and distance from the river, salt contained in the soils and groundwater is moved towards the river.   4
(salt).
8 Secondly, the policy does not allow for free trade of water across impact 
zones. For example, no water can be traded into the HIZ. Economic theory would 
suggest the use of a higher tax rate, equal to the magnitude of the externality between 
the HIZ and LIZ 1 to 4, as opposed to a trade barrier. The trade barrier may prevent 
the use of water in high valued industries located within the HIZ, thereby reducing 
economic profits in the region.  
In this paper we evaluate the Sunraysia Salinity Levy using experiments and 
compare the salinity levy to an alternative salinity tax and to a baseline no regulation 
policy. The salinity tax more closely approximates economic theory as it removes the 
water trade barrier between the HIZ and LIZ 1 to 4, and replaces it with a 'large' tax. 
Table 2 reports the salinity tax as used in this testbed. Given that policy makers 
cannot extrapolate directly from theory, empirical analysis of policy performance is 
important. Further, investigating the performance of the Sunraysia Levy is 
increasingly important as other regulators in other regions are beginning to consider 
the implementation of similar schemes (PIRSA, 2004).  
Our results show that both the salinity levy and salinity tax lead to significant 
environmental improvement as compared to the no regulation case. Both of these 
policies exhibit high performance levels with prices not higher or more volatile due to 
regulation. Comparing the salinity tax and levy, we find that the salinity tax policy 
leads to lower water prices and more trades in the water market in the early periods. 
The salinity tax in addition reduces the cost of salinity control for the regulator and 
also has a superior environmental outcome as compared to the salinity levy.   
I.I. Policy  Testbedding 
 
                                                             
8 Freebairn 2000 discusses the issue of targeting inputs that generate the pollution externality or 
targeting the pollution externality directly.   5
Laboratory experiments can be a powerful and low cost approach for policy 
evaluation. Experiments particularly in the area of environmental economics are very 
useful for ‘whispering in the ears of princes’ (Roth 2002, Cummings, McKee and 
Taylor 2001 ).
9 Experiments use special cases to inform more complex field situations 
and this methodology is called 'experimental testbedding' (Plott 1994).
10 Policy 
decisions must often be made with incomplete information. Policy design therefore is 
a process exposed to significant financial and political costs.
11 Data for the Sunraysia 
region are few in number as this is a recent policy initiative (operating since April 
2002). In addition, there is no centralised database for the trades, so data are not easily 
available.
12 This therefore precludes econometric analysis of policy performance 
using actual field data. However, it is possible to implement 'testbed' laboratory 
experiments which can test the performance of the main features of the policy in a 
controlled and replicable environment.  
   The policy testbed is implemented using a double auction institution. In the 
double auction all bids, offers and transaction prices are public information. The 
double auction was chosen, as the electronic water trade market in the field called 
Watermove
13, resembles most closely the double auction. The double auction 
                                                             
9 Cummings et. al. 2001 draw on Roth’s 1986 description of how experimental economics offers the 
possibility of using scientific methods to advise policy makers about practical questions whose answers 
lie beyond the reliable knowledge of the profession.   
 
10 Testbeds can be used to compare the performance of different policies, for example, Plott 1983 used 
experiments to examine the performance of tradable emissions permits and taxes. They are useful to 
develop policy where the institution upon which the policy is designed may not be well specified, for 
example, Cason, Gangadharan and Duke 2003a. investigate the information structure of procurement 
auctions for non-point source emissions. Also, in situations where the environment does not conform to 
theory, for example, Cason, Gangadharan and Duke 2003b. investigate the performance of tradable 
emissions permits when there is one large player in the market, and where field data is not available for 
empirical analysis as is the case reported in this paper.  
11 For example, in 2000 the British 3G package bid spectrum auction raised revenue of  $US34 billion 
(Binmore and Klemperer, 2002). In contrast the New Zealand independent bid auction, conducted in 
1990, failed to account for substitutability between licences resulting in inefficient allocation of 
licences across bidders and prices paid were often much less than the winning bidder's highest bid 
(Milgrom, 2004). In one case the highest bid was NZ$7 million and the second bid was NZ$5,000. The 
realised revenue was NZ$36 million much less than the expected NZ$250 million (McMillan, 1994).  
12 In the future Watermove will create a database on trades and report historical data on electronic water 
trades (www.watermove.com.au). Data on water trades is only available from individual brokers, who 
would have information about the trades that they oversee, not the total trades in the market.    
13 www.watermove.com.au   6
institution performs efficiently (it converges to the theoretical competitive 
equilibrium) even with a small number of traders who know nothing about the market 
conditions ex-ante (Smith 1962 and 1964). The strong performance of the double 
auction is generally attributed to the sequential nature of bids. This sequential 
property means sellers offer high and decrease their bids and buyers bid low and 
increase their bids. This overall improvement rule means the highest marginal value 
and lowest marginal cost units should be traded first (and so on forming the demand 
and supply array). This forces price formation towards the value of marginal units 
(Plott and Smith 1978).
14 
The continuous improvement rule accommodates situations where bidders are 
indifferent with whom they trade. In some markets, however, subjects may have 
different quality characteristics such that agents prefer to trade with one particular 
agent over another. These quality characteristics may arise, for example, in markets 
that involve trust or markets where social factors may be important. The salinity levy 
is similar to a market with different qualities. Sellers of irrigation water have different 
quality attributes from the point of view of buyers: buyers will prefer to buy from 
sellers with lower levies/taxes (higher quality from the buyers’ perspective). 
Therefore, a buyer may be willing to purchase water from a seller with a higher 
marginal cost but a lower levy/tax than a seller with a lower marginal cost but higher 
levy/tax. Given this heterogeneity the overall continuous improvement rule of the 
standard double auction may result in some gains from trade not being realised. In this 
paper therefore, we relax this rule as explained in the following section and the 
resulting trading institution can be thought of as a modified double auction. We 
examine the performance of this institution and compare with other double auction 
experiments in the literature. 
                                                             
14 Holt.C., In Kagel and Roth eds. 1995, provides an excellent discussion of the double auction trading   7
II. Experimental  Design 
II.I.  Environment and Procedures 
As described above, the differential taxes in the field imply that sellers are 
heterogenous; buyers are not indifferent as to which seller they trade with. In the 
experiments we therefore modify the standard double auction by removing the overall 
improvement rule on the seller side and instead introduce an individual improvement 
rule. Namely, a new offer to sell must be lower than the individual seller’s previous 
offer but does not need be lower than the best current offer to sell. Sellers in effect 
become different markets, and their offers to sell including any levy or tax are 
displayed separately.  Buyers continue to face the overall improvement rule. This 
design attribute should allow buyers to trade with sellers whose quality they most 
prefer.  
The levies and taxes are public information and are known at the beginning of 
each trading period. This creates a situation where buyers have more information 
about sellers’ relative costs than sellers do about buyers: Buyers know the relative tax 
competitiveness of each seller matched to each buyer (see Table 2). Therefore, buyers 
know the minimum price wedge – the tax – each seller must allow for in their bids, to 
remain competitive against other sellers. This could create a situation similar to that 
investigated by Cason and Plott, 2004, where one side of the market is forced to 
disclose more information than the other. Cason and Plott suggest that asymmetric 
information disclosure worsens market performance and harms the discloser. Further, 
the introduction of the tax and levy reduces some buyers’ possible surplus as 
compared to the no regulation case. The loss in possible surplus may harden these 
buyers’ bargaining as they try to secure a portion of the reduced surplus (Smith 1962 
and Smith and Williams 1982 and 1989). 
                                                                                                                                                                          
institution.   8
As the aim of this research is to specifically test the performance of an operating 
field policy we employ parameters that correspond to field conditions. Subjects in the 
experiment represent irrigators in the Sunraysia region. The allocation of subjects 
across different industries, irrigation technologies and locations approximates that in 
the field as reported by SunRise 21, 2004 and discussed with regional government 
officers. Cost and value ranges are taken from the Victorian and New South Wales 
Departments of Primary Industries’ reported gross margins. The exact costs and 
values for each industry were drawn randomly from a uniform distribution with the 
indicated ranges. Subjects therefore had different cost and value parameters to 
represent the heterogeneity between different industries (due to different production 
systems) and within the same industry (due to different skill levels and irrigation 
technology). Table 3 shows the cost and value ranges, the distribution of land-use and 
the allocation of experimental subjects. Cost and value ranges remained private 
information throughout all sessions.  
Experimental subjects were undergraduate students from the University of 
Melbourne. Ten subjects participated in each session, randomly assigned as 5 sellers 
and 5 buyers. We report 11 sessions each with 14 trading periods in which subjects 
participated in a computerised modified double auction. Two training periods were 
conducted to verify subjects' understanding of the instructions, computer software and 
accounting rules; the training periods were not included in subjects' final earnings. 
Subjects were read aloud the instructions as shown in the appendix. Each market 
period was open for 5 minutes, during which subjects were free to make or accept 
offers to buy and sell units. Subjects could only sell or buy one unit at a time, and 
could buy or sell up to three units in a trading period.
15 Neutral terminology was used 
throughout the instructions and sessions, as is the common practice in experimental 
                                                                                                                                                                          
   9
economics.
16 The computerised auction was implemented using web-based software 
designed and developed at the University of Melbourne. The trading screens are 
reproduced in the appendix. Subjects recorded their end of period profits on record 
sheets as shown in the appendix, and their end of period earnings were also shown on 
their computer screens at the end of each period. Subjects were paid their earnings in 
cash at the end of the session, and earnings ranged between $20 - $30 Australian 
dollars. Sessions lasted between one and a half to two hours.  
II.II. Treatments 
Table 4 summarises the experimental design. Table 5 presents the price, 
transaction quantity, surplus and salt impact predictions for the water market 
(treatment 1), salinity tax (treatment 2) and salinity levy (treatment 3). We conducted 
three sessions for treatment 1 to measure market performance when subjects are free 
to trade water with no salinity regulation. We implemented treatment 1 as a policy 
comparison to treatments 2 and 3; but, as described above, we are also interested in 
how the double auction institution performs when the improvement rule is relaxed 
from the seller’s side. As is well known, the standard double auction yields high 
efficiencies (Smith 1962).
17 While in this paper we do not implement a standard 
double auction treatment, we do attempt to provide some preliminary information on 
the effect of relaxing the overall improvement rule by comparing the efficiency 
estimates found in (our) treatment 1 to those reported by other researchers.  
  In treatment 2, we conducted four salinity tax sessions in which the water trade 
barrier is removed and replaced with a ‘large’ tax. This tax is equal to the relative 
                                                                                                                                                                          
15 If a seller did not sell a unit then he did not incur the cost of the unit. 
16 Subjects traded fictitious units not water. The term tax was however used in the experiment.  
17 For example, Smith and Williams 1981 observed efficiencies of 99% with experienced subjects 
while with inexperienced subjects efficiency was 95% (Smith and Williams 1982). These findings have 
been replicated in many studies and across different environments, using conditions of shifting supply 
(Davis, Harrison and Williams, 1993), market power (Smith, 1981, Smith and Williams, 1989) and 
multiple unit trades (Plott and Gray, 1990).   10
difference in salt cost across impact zones.
18 We were interested in how this policy, 
which more closely approximates the theoretical externality tax, would operate 
relative to the field policy. In treatment 3, we conducted four sessions with salinity 
levy and the trade barrier as per the field policy.  
III.  Data analysis and Results  
We focus on the impact of the salinity levy (treatment 3) and the alternative 
salinity tax (treatment 2) – as compared to the water market (treatment 1) – on four 
market outcomes: prices, quantities, surpluses and salinity concentrations. In Section 
׀׀׀.׀׀׀, we examine the individual offer behaviour of sellers and buyers to investigate 
further the difference in price across the three treatments.  
III.I.  Overview of Results  
We start the discussion of results by examining the figures that summarise the data 
for these outcomes. Figure 2 presents average transaction prices across all sessions for 
the three treatments. We observe average transaction prices for treatment 1 (no 
regulation) are higher than those for treatments 2 and 3 (regulation). In all periods, 
except for period 4, average transaction price for the salinity levy is higher than for 
the salinity tax. Transaction prices for all treatments lie within the predicted price 
range for treatment 1. Convergence occurs when outcomes are closer to the 
competitive equilibrium predictions in the late periods than in the early periods.   
Using the convergence measure introduced in Noussair, Plott and Riezman 2003, 
|Average outcome in the late periods – predicted outcome | < |Average outcome in the 
early periods – predicted outcome|, we find that transaction prices in treatment 1 (not 
                                                             
18From Table 2, we can observe that the difference in the cost of trading a unit of water between LIZ 1 
and 2, and LIZ 2 and 3, is $26. Further, the difference in the cost of trading a unit of water between LIZ 
2 and 3, and LIZ 3 and 4, is $65. Therefore the relative difference in cost is 2.5 (65/26 = 2.5). If we 
extend this to trades of water between LIZ 3 and 4, and LIZ 4 and 5, we find the tax between LIZ 4 and 
5 should be equal to 162 (162/65 = 2.5).  
    11
in treatments 2 and 3) converge to the equilibrium prediction.
19 Figure 3 shows 
average transaction quantity for water across all sessions for the three treatments. We 
can observe transaction quantity increasing in treatments 2 and 3 from approximately 
6 units in period 2, to 10 units in period 11. Treatment 1, however, does not visually 
exhibit this upward trend with quantity traded remaining between 8 and 9 units except 
for period 9 when it is 7 units.  
Figure 4 shows the average change in salt concentration at the monitoring 
point across all sessions for the three treatments. The change in salinity concentration 
is measured as a reduction (improvement) in electro-conductivity (EC) at the 
monitoring point. Improvement in concentration appears to be greater for treatments 2 
and 3 as compared to treatment 1. Further, observed improvement in EC is greater for 
the salinity tax (treatment 2) as compared to the salinity levy (treatment 3) except for 
the early periods 1 to 3 and period 12.  
Figures 5 and 6 show average buyer and seller surplus respectively. Figure 7 
shows total economic surplus. In all treatments buyer surplus appears to increase 
towards the prediction of $91.875 for treatment 1 and $93.875 for treatments 2 and 
3.
20 In early periods 1 to 7, buyers achieve on average 54% of the predicted surplus in 
treatment 1, 67% in treatment 2, and 60% in treatment 3. In later periods 8 to 14, 
buyers in treatment 1 achieve 72% of possible surplus and in treatments 2 and 3 they 
achieve 73%. Seller surplus appears to be higher than the prediction of $51.50 for 
treatment 1, and $50.88 in treatments 2 and 3. In early periods sellers achieve on 
average 140% of available surplus in treatment 1, 107% in treatment 2 and 120% in 
                                                             
19 Early periods are defined as periods 1-7 and late periods as 8-14. Prices have a big equilibrium range 
and that might explain why we do not observe convergence using this measure in treatments 2 and 3. 
We take the middle point of the range as the predicted price. 
20 Predicted buyer surplus increases when the tax and levy are introduced as compared to the no 
regulation baseline. Buyer 3, however, located in the high impact zone suffers a loss in surplus when 
the tax and levy are introduced. The increase in treatments 2 and 3 arises as buyer 1 is able to trade an 
additional unit as compared to treatment 1, and the midpoint of the equilibrium range in treatments 2 
and 3 is lower as compared to treatment 1 because the equilibrium range widens as the tax and levy   12
treatment 3. In later periods sellers achieve 120% in treatment 1, 112% in treatment 2 
and 130% in treatment 3. Total surplus exhibits an upward trend towards the 
prediction for all treatments. In early periods total surplus is 84% of possible surplus 
for treatment 1, 82% for treatment 2 and 87% for treatment 3. In later periods subjects 
achieve 91% of total surplus in treatment 1, and 87% and 93% in treatments 2 and 3 
respectively.  
The efficiency outcome for treatment 1 (91% in later periods) is reasonably 
consistent with the efficiency levels found in standard double auction experiments 
conducted by other researchers, in which efficiency generally lies between 95% and 
99%. While we need to look closer at individual offer behaviour (Section ׀׀׀.׀׀׀), we 
can tentatively conclude that the double auction is reasonably efficient when the 
overall bid improvement rule is removed from one side of the market.   The 
differences in total surplus between treatment 1 and 3, could be influenced by 
subjects' experience (Smith and Williams 1982).
21 Treatments 2 and 3 used subjects 
experienced in this trading institution as the environment was more difficult to 
understand. Experience, however, did not lead to higher surpluses in treatment 2 as 
compared to treatment 1. The field parameters used in the paper may also explain this 
slightly lower surplus in treatment 2 as compared to treatments 1 and 3. Namely, that 
efficiency can be influenced by the structure of the demand and supply schedules 
(Plott 1983): In this experiment the extra-marginal units are close to the predicted 
equilibrium - 12 experimental dollars on the demand side and 14 experimental dollars 
on the supply side (see Figure 1). The two extra-marginal traders, seller 5 and buyer 4, 
can only sell one unit profitably in equilibrium. Any variability in price will give these 
subjects a chance to trade their second unit, and these trades reduce efficiency. This 
                                                                                                                                                                          
force a reorganising of buyer and seller matches, allowing some lower value buyers to trade with lower 
cost sellers as compared to treatment 1. 
21 Smith and Williams find convergence to the theoretical equilibrium is more rapid with experienced 
subjects.   13
could also partly explain the slightly lower efficiency observed in our modified 
double auction as compared to the standard double auction. In all three treatments 
however we observe convergence towards the predicted efficiency level using the 
convergence measure described above (Noussair, Plott and Reizman 2003). 
III.II Econometric Tests 
To examine if these market outcomes or performance indicators are 
statistically different between treatments, we conduct parametric t-tests and non 
parametric Wilcoxon ranksum tests. These tests presented in Table 7, use one 
observation per session hence providing powerful and statistically independent 
comparisons between treatments. Average transaction prices are seen to be 
significantly lower in treatment 2 as compared to treatment 1. This finding supports 
the visual observation from Figure 2. Prices in treatment 3 are lower than in treatment 
1, however the difference is not significant. Typically transaction prices would be 
expected to increase in treatments with regulation. We gain some additional insights 
into this result when we explore the offer behavior of sellers and buyers in section 
׀׀׀.׀׀׀. Average quantity is not significantly different across treatments 1 and 2 using a 
t-test or the Wilcoxon test. Average quantity is however significantly lower in 
treatment 3 as compared to treatments 2 and 1.  
  Average surplus is not significantly different across treatments. The 
environmental improvement is significantly higher in treatments 2 and 3 as compared 
to treatment 1 due to the introduction of a tax or a levy to reduce the salt impact. 
Comparing treatments 2 and 3, the point estimates show that the environmental 
improvement is higher in treatment 2 than in 3 though the difference is not 
statistically significant.  
To examine if the outcomes have different volatility across treatments we present  
variance ratio tests in Table 8, which determine whether the standard deviation of   14
prices, quantities and the environmental impact are different across treatments. We 
find that there are no significant treatment differences in prices, quantity traded and 
the environmental impact. The hypotheses that the variability in these outcomes are 
equal in the three treatments cannot be rejected. If these standard deviations are used 
to measure stability in these markets, then we would conclude that there is no 
difference in terms of stability and volatility in any of the three treatments. Hence 
introducing regulations (as in treatments 2 and 3) does not lead to more price or 
quantity dispersion.  
The graphs and the pairwise comparisons provide valuable information about the 
behaviour of subjects in these three treatments. To explore further these general 
impressions we conduct parametric regression analysis to determine whether the 
conclusions are robust when controlling for other factors like experience (captured by 
the time periods that the subjects participate in the market) and session effects.  
Table 9 presents results from random effects estimation for price, averaged for 
the different sessions in each treatment. In the random effects models, the session 
represents the random effect to account for the correlation of market outcomes within 
a session. We present results from 11 sessions and 14 time periods in each session 
(11*14 =154 data points). 
The equation we estimate is the following:  
 
12 2 3 3 constant
    
it it Yt D D e β ββ =+ + + +
                                                 (Model 1) 
Where  Y indicates the outcome that we want to examine (transaction prices, 
quantity traded, surplus from trading, environmental improvement), i the particular 
treatment (1, 2 or 3) and t represents time as measured by the number of market 
periods in the treatment (1 to 14), therefore coefficient β1 captures the impact of time 
on average outcomes. D2 and D3 are dummy variables for treatments 2 and 3   15
respectively (D2 takes the value of 1 when the treatment being considered is treatment 
2 and takes the value of 0 otherwise and similarly D3 takes the value of 1 for data 
relating to treatment 3). The coefficients on the dummy variables D2 and D3, capture 
the impact of treatment 2 and treatment 3 respectively, relative to the baseline 
treatment 1. 
Model 1 in Table 9 presents results when the dependent variable is average price. 
The estimates show that the prices in treatment 2 are significantly lower than in the 
baseline treatment, treatment 1. However the prices in treatment 3 are not 
significantly different from treatment 1. This is consistent with the results obtained 
from the pairwise tests. The magnitude of the coefficient for treatment 2 is double the 
coefficient for treatment 3 indicating that prices are lower by a larger amount in 
treatment 2 than in 3. In Model 1a in this table we present results from an equation 
where we include the environmental impact as an explanatory variable in the price 
equation. We include salinity as an explanatory variable to explore if prices for water 
increase as environmental (salinity) quality improves. Our results show that the 
environmental improvement has no statistically significant impact on prices. This 
could imply that implementing policies that would improve the environmental quality 
by reducing salinity concentrations would not lead to significantly higher prices. 
Model 2 explicitly analyses the effect of time on the outcomes by separating out the 
early period and the later period effects in the three treatments. To estimate 
convergence levels we use the framework described below and estimate models with 
a random effect error structure where session is the random effect: 
12 23 2 4 35 3 c o n s t a n t ( 1 /) ( 1 /) ( ( 1 ) /) ( 1 /) ( ( 1 ) /) it it Yt D t D t t D t D t t e β ββ ββ =+ + + − + + − +
 
 (Model 2)   16
The variable 1/t captures short run effects and the variable (t-1)/t captures the 
long run patterns in the data. When t=1, ie in the first period, the coefficients of D2 
(β2) and D3 (β4) capture initial price in that treatment. As t gets large the weight of the 
coefficient of Di1/t becomes small because 1/t approaches zero. Meanwhile the weight 
of the coefficient of Di(t-1)/t becomes large as t becomes large because (t-1)/t 
approaches 1, hence β3 and β5 capture the long run tendencies in the data. The 
coefficient β1 indicates the impact of treatment 1 (the baseline treatment) in the short 
run and the constant term is the long run indicator for the baseline treatment.
22  
Model 2 in Table 9 compares both the short term and long term price differences 
in the three treatments. The estimates from this regression show that the transaction 
prices in treatments 2 and 3 are significantly lower than in treatment 1 in the short 
term (as shown by the negative and significant coefficient on (D21/t) and (D31/t)). In 
the long term prices in the two treatments are not significantly different than in 
treatment 1. The indicators for the baseline treatment show that prices are higher in 
both the early periods and the late periods (the coefficient of the 1/t variable and the 
constant term which is an indicator of the long run impact of treatment 1, are both 
positive and significant) and that prices fall over time in this treatment (the constant 
994.3, which is the long run impact is less than 994.3 plus 37.77 = 1032.1, which is 
the short run impact).  
Table 10 reports the results from models where the dependent variable is average 
quantity traded. Model 1 shows that the coefficient for treatment 3 is negative and 
significant, implying that the quantity traded is significantly lower in treatment 3 as 
compared to treatment 1. Model 2 indicates that this reduction in quantity traded is 
mainly due to the lower number of trades in the early period as treatment 3 exhibits 
different convergence rates in the early periods. The average quantity traded is 
                                                             
22 We estimated models with alternative specifications suggested by Noussair et al. (1995) and   17
significantly lower (1.51 units lower) than in treatment 1 in the early periods, as 
captured by the coefficient for the interaction variable D31/t. In the later periods 
however the quantity traded is not significantly different in treatment 3 as compared 
to treatment 1.  
Table 11 reports results from random effects models on economic surplus or 
earnings of subjects in the experiment. In Model 1, the coefficient of period (t) is 
positive and significant indicating that the total surplus increases over time in all three 
treatments. Surplus in treatments 2 and 3 are not significantly different than in 
treatment 1. The convergence model (Model 2) also shows that the surplus is not 
different in the short or long run in treatments 2 and 3 as compared to treatment 1. In 
treatment 1, the surplus is higher in the later periods as compared to the earlier periods 
(137.82 exceeds 137.82-84.38 = 53.44).  
Tables 12 and 13 separate out the total surplus into buyer surplus and seller 
surplus. In Model 1 the variable period is positive and significant, implying that buyer 
surplus increases over time. In both treatments 2 and 3 the buyer surplus is not 
significantly different than in treatment 1. The convergence model (Model 2) also 
shows that the buyer surplus is not different across treatments either in the short run or 
in the long run. Buyer surplus increases over time in treatment 1 as evidenced by the 
positive and significant sign on the constant term and the negative sign on the 
coefficient of 1/t. Models for seller surplus are reported in Table 13.  Model 1 
indicates that seller surplus is significantly lower in treatment 2 as compared to 
treatment 1.  The convergence model (Model 2) suggests that this is mainly driven by 
the low seller surplus in the early periods in treatment 2 as compared to treatment 1. 
The point estimates also suggest that the seller surplus is lower in the early periods in 
treatment 3 as compared to treatment 1 however the magnitude of the reduction in 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Ashenfelter et. al. (1992) and find that the results are exactly the same.     18
surplus is a lot higher for treatment 2 (in addition, the coefficient for D31/t is not 
significant).  Seller surplus is not significantly different in the later periods for 
treatments 2 and 3. Examining the coefficient of 1/t and the constant term shows that 
the seller surplus is falling over time in treatment 1 (60.4 in later periods and 60.4 + 
51.7= 112.1 in the early periods).     
The results for the seller and buyer surplus indicate that the seller surplus is 
higher and buyer surplus lower in treatment 1 (at least in the early periods) when we 
compare across treatments 2 and 1. In treatment 2, buyers have to pay a tax and 
information about this explicit tax perhaps makes them unwilling to pay a higher price 
in the water market. This is because buyers perceive a reduction in possible surplus in 
treatment 2, and this reduction probably hardens the bargaining of buyers. Though 
point estimates indicate that this effect exists in treatment 3 as well, the difference 
between treatments 3 and 1 is not statistically significant. This is perhaps because in 
treatment 3, Buyer 3 can only buy from Seller 2 and therefore cannot bargain with 
other sellers to lower price. 
Table 14 presents results from random effect regressions where we examine 
whether the environmental impact (reduction in salinity concentration) is different 
across treatments. Model 1 shows that the average environmental impact is 
significantly higher in both treatments 2 and 3 and that makes sense as treatment 1 
does not have any regulation on the level of salt generated by the water trades. The 
convergence model (Model 2) suggests that the average environmental impact is 
higher in the initial periods in treatment 3 as compared to treatment 1 (coefficient of 
D31/t). Environmental improvement however increases in treatment 2 as compared to 
treatment 1 in the later periods (coefficient of D2t-1/t) and the environmental 
improvement in the later periods is greater in treatment 2 as compared to treatment 3.    19
III.III Offer Behaviour 
In this section, we explore the strategies employed by the individual sellers and 
buyers by examining the prices at which they offer to sell or buy. Some of these offers 
would be accepted and would form the transaction prices in the market, while others 
would not be accepted. Analysing individual strategies could help us understand if 
subjects exhibit behavioural differences in the three treatments.  
We examine individual offer behaviour for all periods and for the last five 
periods.
23 Table 15 presents the average buy and sell offer price for each treatment. 
Average buy offers are lower in treatments 2 and 3 as compared to treatment 1 when 
averaged across all periods. Average buy offers are 26 experimental dollars lower in 
treatment 2, and 4 experimental dollars lower in treatment 3 as compared to treatment 
1. Across the last five periods, average buy offers in treatment 2 are 14 experimental 
dollars lower but in treatment 3 average buy offers are 6 experimental dollars higher 
as compared to treatment 1. These averages provide some preliminary support for the 
hypothesis that buyers are acting more competitively in the tax treatment. 
Table 16 presents results from both ordinary least squares and random effects 
models (with buyer representing the random effects) for buy offers for all periods and 
the last five periods. Buyer offers are a function of value of the unit, time period and 
the treatments. Buy offers are increasing over time as shown by the positive and 
significant period estimate for the all periods data set and falling, although not 
significantly so for the last five periods. Buy offers are significantly higher the higher 
the buyer’s value for a unit, and this makes sense as higher marginal value buyers are 
willing to pay higher prices under the rules of demand and supply. Buy offers are not 
significantly different between treatments 1 and 3. The point estimates indicate that 
                                                             
23 By the end of the experiment subjects would have identified the strategies that are optimal for them, 
hence examining the data from the last five periods of the experiment, would help reduce the impact of 
subject error.   20
buy offers are lower in treatment 2 relative to treatment 1, but the estimates are not 
significant (except in the OLS regression for treatment 2 for all periods).  
Table 17 presents the results for seller offers’. Seller offers are falling over time as 
seen by the significant negative estimate on the period variable for the all periods data 
set. In the last five periods the offers are not significantly different across time. As is 
expected sellers with higher cost units ask for significantly higher prices (cost is 
positive and significant). Treatment 2 dummy is positive and significant: sellers are 
asking for higher prices in treatment 2 as compared to treatment 1 (significantly 
higher according to the OLS regressions, but not according to the Random effects 
model).  
To investigate if the trade barrier in treatment 3 is influencing offer behaviour, we 
explore the behaviour of Buyer 2, the buyer located in the highest impact zone, and 
Seller 3, the seller (also) located in the highest impact zone (see Table 2) between 
treatments 2 and 3. In treatment 3 both Buyer 2 and Seller 3 are located behind a 
water trade barrier. This means that Buyer 2 can only buy from Seller 3 (but Seller 3 
can trade with all buyers).  Seller 3 knows this (as do all other subjects) and therefore 
it is reasonable to expect that this monopoly supplier (to Buyer 2) will attempt to 
extract more surplus on trades with Buyer 2. In treatment 2 the trade barrier is 
removed and replaced with a large tax. Buyer 2 can then begin to act more 
competitively and attempt to extract more rent on each trade. 
In summary the offer behaviour indicates that in treatment 2, sellers want to sell at 
higher prices and buyers are offering to buy at lower prices as compared to treatment 
1. This is confirmed by the OLS results, but gets less support from the Random effects 
models. Buyers seem to be relatively more aggressive, hence traded prices are lower 
in treatment 2 than in treatment 1. In treatment 3, one of the buyers: Buyer 2 can only 
trade with Seller 3 and this prevents Buyer 2 from acting competitively. In treatment 2   21
Seller 3 is no longer protected by the trade barrier and Buyer 2 can now participate in 
bargaining with multiple sellers. Therefore traded prices are lower in treatment 2 as 
compared to 3. This difference in behaviour becomes much less when we examine the 
offer data from the last five periods and this is consistent with the results from the 
transaction price regressions (Table 9), where we see that the long term effects are not 
significant across treatments.  
IV.   Conclusion and Policy Observations 
The specific design of policies can have an enormous impact on the performance 
of the regulatory policy being considered. The laboratory experiment reported here 
was implemented to specifically explore the performance of the Sunraysia Salinity 
Levy, as implemented in the irrigation regions located on the Victorian side of the 
Murray River between the town of Nyah and the South Australia Border. We 
compared the performance of this field policy to an alternative salinity tax. The 
salinity tax removed trade barriers used in the salinity levy, and replaced the barrier 
with a ‘large’ tax. We compared the performance of these policies to a no regulation 
water market baseline using a modified double auction. This modified design has 
similar levels of efficiency and the offer behaviour of subjects is consistent with other 
standard double auctions.     
Salinity improvement, measured as a decrease in electro-conductivity (EC) at the 
Morgan monitoring point, is higher for the salinity tax than the salinity levy. Our 
estimates show (Model 1, Table 14) that overall environmental improvement is 
0.0001 EC units greater under the salinity tax than the salinity levy when compared 
against no regulation. Discussions with regional water brokers indicate that the 
average size of each (permanent) water trade in the region is at least 100 megalitres. If 
each trade is at a minimum 100 megalitres, then the difference in EC improvement 
between the salinity tax and salinity levy is 0.01. The cost of extracting 1 EC of salt   22
ranges between approximately $550,000 and $4,250,000 capitalised cost per EC unit 
extracted from the river (MDBC, 2003).
24 Creating new opportunities for salt 
interception locations, which could potentially reduce the salt concentration, are 
becoming increasingly scarce. Hence we can expect to observe costs in the higher end 
of the range mentioned above (Stakeholder workshop, Mildura, June 2002). If we 
assume the median of this range, which is $2,400,000, as a representative estimate of 
interception costs, then in this laboratory testbed the salinity levy saves society 
$48,000 ($2,400,000*0.02) and the salinity tax saves $72,000 ($2,400,000*0.03) as 
compared to no regulation. The long-run differences estimated in model 2, which 
account for subject experience across periods, are 0.04 for the salinity tax and 0.01 for 
the levy.
25 Therefore, in the long-run the salinity tax saves society $96,000 and the 
salinity levy $24,000 as compared to no regulation. From this we can imply that, 
given the parameters used in this testbed the salinity tax provides a 4:1 benefit to 
society, or only a quarter of the public funds required to intercept salinity under the 
levy are required under the tax.  
  While both policies improve environmental outcomes as compared to the no 
regulation case, it was unexpected to observe transaction price for water higher in the 
no regulation as compared to one of the regulation treatments. Taxes (and levies) 
generally increase the cost of goods (in this case water) by introducing a per unit cost 
on each unit purchased. Therefore, we would expect water prices to rise in the salinity 
levy and salinity tax treatments as compared to the water market only. Instead we 
observe (Model 1, Table 9) that average transaction price for water is lower in the tax 
treatment as compared to no regulation treatment. The price in the salinity levy 
treatment is also lower but the difference is not statistically significant. This 
                                                             
24 The costs are discounted over thirty years with a 4% discount rate. They include construction of 
engineering works and operation and maintenance costs. 
25 Double auctions generally perform better (equilibrate faster and closer to the expected equilibrium) 
in the later periods. This is called the sawtooth effect (Plott, 2004).    23
difference relative to no regulation treatment is maintained in the short term for both 
treatments but not in the long term (Model 2). An examination of individual offer 
behaviour helps us understand this better. When buyers are faced with a tax they 
know the tax will reduce their potential surplus (ie. the tax decreases demand). Sellers 
also know this, and both buyers and sellers know the relative (potential) loss of 
surplus for each buyer matched to each seller. When buyers face a decrease in 
potential surplus they may compete more aggressively to secure a larger portion of 
their smaller possible surplus (Smith 1962, Smith and Williams 1982). Sellers know 
buyers face taxes, and therefore expect buyers to attempt to push some of the tax 
burden across to sellers. Sellers will therefore (also) act more aggressively as they are 
faced with a potential decrease in surplus if buyers are successful in shifting some tax. 
This effect is stronger in treatment 2 as the trade barrier is removed therefore 
removing the ‘protection’ Seller 3 enjoyed in treatment 3 (where he was the sole 
supplier to Buyer 2) and allowing Buyer 2 to partake in the competitive behaviour.   
  The ability of buyers to tacitly force sellers to lower price when a levy or tax is 
introduced could (also) be linked to the information structure of this double auction 
institution: buyers have more information than sellers, as buyers know the tax/levy 
margin tagged to each seller. The taxes/levies are possibly some form of exogenously 
imposed information revelation. Namely, before each market trading period opens 
buyers know the tax/levy competitiveness of each seller with each buyer. Buyers 
know the minimum difference in price (the levy/tax) each seller must achieve if they 
want to trade with a given buyer. This is similar to the finding in Cason and Plott, 
2004, that disclosure of market strategies by one side of the market hurts the 
disclosing parties. 
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  For regulators considering the implementation of a salinity levy this testbed 
confirms that an economic incentive based regulation does improve the environmental 
outcome. However, using an instrument like the salinity levy discussed in this paper, 
which creates barriers to trade into certain geographic regions or salinity impact 
zones, may not be the most cost effective method. Our results suggest that it may be 
better to introduce a salinity tax without trade barriers as environmental outcome is 
higher thereby requiring fewer public resources to be allocated towards salinity 
interception.    25
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VI. Appendix 
 
Table 1: Salinity impact zones and river salinity concentration impacts 
Impact division  River impact (EC) per 1,000 ML of water traded into the zone 
Low Impact Zone 1 (LIZ 1)  0.02 
Low Impact Zone 2 (LIZ 2)  0.05  
Low Impact Zone 3 (LIZ 3)  0.1  
Low Impact Zone 4 (LIZ 4)  0.2  
High Impact Zone (HIZ)  0.6  
Source: SRWA, 2002. Note: The reported river impacts are long-term averages - 30 years, noting the 
overall prediction over 100 years (MDBC, 2003). 
 
Table 2: Salinity levy and salinity tax 
 Salinity  Levy
a (per megalitre)  Salinity tax
b (per megalitre) 
Water traded 
from  
Water traded to 
 
Water traded to 
  HIZ  LIZ  4 LIZ  3 LIZ  2 LIZ  1 HIZ  LIZ  4 LIZ  3 LIZ  2 LIZ  1 
HIZ  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
LIZ 4  Can't 
trade 
0 0 0 0 292 0 0 0 0
LIZ 3  Can't 
trade 
130 0 0 0 422 130 0 0 0
LIZ 2  Can't 
trade 
195  65 0 0 487 195 65 0 0
LIZ 1  Can't 
trade 
234 104 39 0 526 234 104  39  0
a The salinity levies are taken from the field. These levies are reported by SRWA, 2002 and DNRE, 2001. 
b 
The salinity tax has been calculated for the purposes of this experiment. 
 
Table 3: Value parameters and land-use distribution for Sunraysia.  
Distribution of land-use across salinity impact zones - % of total 
area 
(Number of experimental subjects)
c 
Industry
b  Value of 
irrigation 


















LIZ 1 total 
area 
7231ha 




2% 6%  20% 
1 subject 
Table Grapes  621 - 978  10%  1%  1% 
1 subject 
14% 3% 









a Represents a range for each industry across different irrigation technologies. Technologies are flood, 
pressurised mix, other pressure, overhead and drip. 
b  The table
 does not include all land-uses in the region.
 
We decided not to include field crops and vegetables, as these industries are low value relative to other 
industries included in the experiment. If subjects represented these industries in the experiment then they 
could not profitably trade if on the buyers side and would be able to sell all units at very low price relative 
to all other sellers if on the seller side. Some land-uses were undefined, indicating surveyors do not know 
what is produced on this land. Vacant land was also not included in the experiment. 
c  Experimental 
subjects are distributed across
 industries to approximate land-use in the region.   29
Table 4: Experimental Design 
Treatment Features  Number of sessions 
Treatment 1 – Water Market  Free trade of water, no salinity policy.  3 inexperienced 
Treatment 2 – Water Market with Salinity Tax  Free trade of water, buyers pay salinity tax depending on location of seller and buyer. 4  experienced 
Treatment 3 – Water Market with Salinity Levy  Trade barrier on water trade into the HIZ from all LIZ zones, buyers pay salinity tax in all 
other zones depending on location of seller and buyer.  
4 experienced 
Note: Inexperienced subjects may have participated in an experiment previously, but they had not participated in an experiment using this environment and software. Experienced 
subjects had participated in at least one Treatment 1 session. We chose to use (more) experienced subjects for Treatments 2 and 3 as the environment was more complicated than in 
Treatment 1. 
 
Table 5: Model predictions 
  Water market (Treatment 1)  Salinity tax (Treatment 2)  Salinity levy (Treatment 3) 
Price  1009 - 978  1029 - 930  1029 - 930 
Transaction quantity  8  7  7 
Salinity impact (improvement in EC)  0.000011  0.000049  0.000049 
Average seller Surplus  51.5  50.875  50.875 
Average buyer surplus  91.875  93.875  93.875 
Average total surplus (efficiency)  143.375  144.75  144.75 
   30
Table 6: Average Price, Quantities, Earnings and Salt Impact  
  Average Price (per megalitre)    Average Quantity (megalitre)    Average Earnings (experimental 
dollars) 
 


























1 1034  984 1002  1 9 7 6 1 102  92 126 1 -0.00003 0.000265 0.000705
2  1006 984 997  2 9 7 6 2 112 132 114 2 0.0004933 0.0005625 0.00066
3  1011 986 995  3 8 7 6 3 132 120 120 3 0.0003 0.0004325 0.000665
4 1001 1003  995  4 9 7 7 4 119  120 111 4 0.0001733 0.00091 0.000485
5  1008 982 998  5 8 8 7 5 141 122 134 5 0.0003933 0.000635 0.0005125
6  1003 982 996  6 9 8 8 6 124 117 119 6 0.0005333 0.0007175 0.0005825
7 999 984  1000  7 9 9 8 7 118 122 124 7 0.00044 0.00077 0.00044
8 996 987 988  8 9 8 8 8 132 111 127 8 0.0004167 0.000955 0.00077
9 999 992 996  9 7 9 8 9 143 116 132 9 0.0004067 0.0006625 0.0005325
10 998 988 996  10 9 10 9 10 127 130 138 10 0.0002767 0.00087 0.0002375
11 997 991 998  11 9 10 10 11 119 138 129 11 0.0003733 0.000665 0.000645
12 997 991 996  12 9 10 10 12 132 135 137 12 0.0004167 0.00051 0.0006475
13 997 993 995  13 8 10 10 13 121 132 146 13 0.00024 0.00075 0.0006425




1003 989 996  Average 
quantity 
all periods
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Table 7: Pair wise t-test and Wilcoxon ranksum test for average price, quantity, earnings and salt impact 
  Average Price   Average Quantity  Average Earnings  Average Salt Improvement 
  Treatment 1  Treatment 2  Treatment 3  Treatment 1  Treatment 2  Treatment  3 Treatment  1 Treatment  2 Treatment  3 Treatment  1 Treatment 2  Treatment 3 
Treatment 1    -2.14* -1.09    -1.14 -2.70**    -0.34 0.47    8.94*** 3.10** 
    -1.77* -0.71    -1.06 -1.77*    -0.35 0.35    2.12** 2.14** 
                  
Treatment 2      1.52     -2.11*     0.76     -1.44 
     1.16      -1.73*      0.29      -1.16 
                  
Treatment 3                   
                  
       
**** Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. 
Note: first estimate is the calculated t-statistic, second estimate is the calculated z-statistic. Note: pair-wise estimates use the vertical as the comparison base 
 
  
Table 8: Pair wise variance ratio test for price, quantity and salt impact variability 
  Standard deviation average price  Standard deviation average quantity  Standard deviation average salt 
improvement 
  Treatment 1  Treatment 2  Treatment 3  Treatment 1  Treatment 2  Treatment 3  Treatment 1  Treatment 2  Treatment 3
Treatment 1    0.53 0.38    0.44 0.53    0.55 4.58 
              
Treatment 2      0.71     1.22     8.35 
             
Treatment 3               
*** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%.   
Note: the numbers reported are the relevant F statistics. None of the comparisons are statistically different. Note: pair-wise estimates use vertical as the comparison base  33
Table 9: Random effects estimation models for average transaction price  
  Model 1   Model 1a  Model 2 
constant 1005.896***  1005.6219*** 994.331*** 
 (4.997)  (5.245)  (4.937) 
  (201.32) (191.72) (201.40) 
      
Period (t)  -0.372  -0.379   
 (0.249)  (0.251)   
  (-1.49) (-1.51)   
      
1/t     37.769*** 
     (7.344) 
     (5.14) 
      
Treatment 2  -14.46***  -14.801**   
 (6.13)  (6.466)   
  (-2.36) (-2.29)   
      
Treatment 3  -6.908  -7.153   
 (6.13)  (6.415)   
  (-1.13) (-1.11)   
      
Salt improvement    991.1773   
   (3365.168)  
   (0.29)   
      
Treatment 2 x(1/t)      -49.388*** 
     (9.654) 
     (-5.12) 
      
Treatment 3 x (1/t)      -30.641*** 
     (9.654) 
     (-3.17) 
      
Treatment 2 x (t-1)/t      -3.893 
     (6.531) 
     (-0.60) 
      
Treatment 3 x (t-1)/t      0.2722 
     (6.531) 
     (0.04) 
      
No. of observations  154  154  154 
Wald Chi-squared   7.87  7.54  34.72 
Significance level  0.04  0.10  0.0000 
R-squared (overall)  0.16  0.16  0.26 
The first number in brackets is the standard error; the second number in brackets is the z-statistic. 
*** Significant at 1% 
** Significant at 5% 
* Significant at 10%   34
Table 10: Random effects estimation models for average transaction quantity 
  Model 1   Model 2  
constant 8.607***  8.413*** 
 (0.219)  (0.218) 
  (39.27) (38.59) 
    
Period (t)  -0.005   
 (0.018)   
  (-0.26)   
    
1/t   0.681 
   (0.582) 
   (1.17) 
    
Treatment 2  -0.268   
 (0.226)   
  (-1.18)   
    
Treatment 3  -0.661***   
 (0.226)   
  (-2.92)   
    
Treatment 2 x(1/t)    -0.606 
   (0.633) 
   (-0.96) 
    
Treatment 3 x (1/t)    -1.507** 
   (0.633) 
   (-2.38) 
    
Treatment 2 x (t-1)/t    -0.165 
   (0.288) 
   (-0.57) 
    
Treatment 3 x (t-1)/t    -0.405 
   (0.288) 
   (-1.40) 
No. of observations  154  154 
Wald Chi-squared  9.00  11.2 
Significance level  0.02  0.04 
R-squared (overall)  0.08  0.10 
The first number in brackets is the standard error; the second number in brackets is the z-statistic. 
*** Significant at 1% 
** Significant at 5% 
* Significant at 10%   35
Table 11: Random effects estimation models for average total earnings 
  Model 1   Model 2 
constant 113.639***  137.817*** 
 (0.7.104)  (8.112) 
  (16.00) (16.99) 
    
Period (t)  1.352***   
 (0.402)   
  (3.36)   
    
1/t   -84.381** 
   (40.713) 
   (-2.07) 
    
Treatment 2  -3.279   
 (7.926)   
  (-0.41)   
    
Treatment 3  2.498   
 (7.926)   
  (0.32)   
    
Treatment 2 x(1/t)    2.401 
   (47.292) 
   (0.05) 
    
Treatment 3 x (1/t)    20.130 
   (47.292) 
   (0.43) 
    
Treatment 2 x(t-1/t)    -4.160 
   (10.732) 
   (-0.39) 
    
Treatment 3 x (t-1/t)    -0.238 
   (10.732) 
   (-0.02) 
    
No. of observations  154  154 
Wald Chi-squared  11.94  13.09 
Significance level  0.007  0.02 
R-squared (overall)  0.07  0.08 
The first number in brackets is the standard error; the second number in brackets is the z-statistic. 
*** Significant at 1% 
** Significant at 5% 
* Significant at 10%
 
 
Table 12: Random effects estimation models for average buyer earnings 
  Model 1    Model 2    36
constant 44.810***  77.423*** 
 (8.738)  (9.44) 
  (5.13) (8.20) 
    
period (t)  1.508***   
 (0.381)   
  (0.71)   
    
1/t   -136.122***
   (37.910) 
   (-3.59) 
    
Treatment 2  7.455   
 (10.520)   
  (0.71)   
    
Treatment 3  4.921   
 (10.520)   
  (0.47)   
    
Treatment 2 x(1/t)    66.304 
   (44.670) 
   (1.48) 
    
Treatment 3 x (1/t)    56.304 
   (44.670) 
   (1.26) 
    
Treatment 2 x(t-1/t)    -1.677 
   (12.493) 
   (-0.13) 
    
Treatment 3 x (t-1/t)    -3.052 
   (12.493) 
   (-0.24) 
    
No. of observations  154  154 
Chi-squared 16.17  23.18 
Significance level  0.0010  0.0003 
R-squared (overall)  0.09  0.12 
The first number in brackets is the standard error; the second number in brackets is the z-statistic. 
*** Significant at 1% 
** Significant at 5% 
* Significant at 10% 
   37
Table 13: Random effects estimation models for average seller earnings 
  Model 1    Model 2  
constant 68.829***  60.393*** 
 (4.812)  (5.560) 
 (14.29)  (10.86) 
    
Period (t)  -0.156   
 (0.289)   
 (-0.54)   
    
1/t   51.741* 
   (29.078) 
   (1.78) 
    
(t-1)/t    
    
    
    
Treatment 2  -10.734**   
 (5.235)   
 (-2.05)   
    
Treatment 3  -2.42   
 (5.235)   
 (-0.46)   
    
Treatment 2 x(1/t)    -63.903** 
   (33.708) 
   (-1.90) 
    
Treatment 3 x (1/t)    -36.174 
   (33.707) 
   (-1.07) 
    
Treatment 2 x(t-1/t)    -2.483 
   (7.356) 
   (-0.34) 
    
Treatment 3 x (t-1/t)    2.814 
   (7.356) 
   (0.38) 
    
No. of observations  154  154 
Chi-squared 5.24  8.52 
Significance level  0.15  0.13 
R-squared (overall)  0.09  0.10 
The first number in brackets is the standard error; the second number in brackets is the z-statistic. 
*** Significant at 1% 
** Significant at 5% 
* Significant at 10%   38
Table 14: Random effects estimation models for salt improvement 
 Model  1  Model  2 
constant 0.0003***  0.0004*** 
 (0.00007)  (0.00007) 
 (4.08)  (6.12) 
    
Period (t)  7.28e-06   
 (6.20e-06)   
 (1.17)   
    
1/t   -0.0003 
   (0.0002 
   (-1.72) 
    
Treatment 2  0.0003***   
 (0.00007)   
 (5.18)   
    
Treatment 3  0.0002***   
 (0.00007)   
 (3.73)   
    
Treatment 2 x(1/t)    0.0002 
   (0.0002) 
   (0.93) 
    
Treatment 3 x (1/t)    0.0006*** 
   (0.0002) 
   (3.06) 
    
    
Treatment 2 x (t-1/t)    0.0004*** 
   (0.00009) 
   (4.41) 
    
Treatment 3 x (t-1/t)    0.0001 
   (0.00009) 
   (1.51) 
    
No. of observations  154  154 
Wald Chi-squared  29.06  41.85 
Significance level  0.000  0.0000 
R-squared (overall)  0.17  0.24 
The first number in brackets is the standard error; the second number in brackets is the z-statistic. 
*** Significant at 1% 
** Significant at 5% 
* Significant at 10%   39
Table 15: Average buy and sell offer price 

















































Note: First number in brackets is the standard deviation, second number in brackets is the number of observations. 
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Table 16: Estimation models for buyer offers  
  OLS regression  Random effects estimation 
  All periods  Last five 
periods 
All periods  Last five 
periods 
Constant  528.86*** 485.005***  577.194*** 516.85*** 
  (39.877)  (82.539) (46.76) (80.655) 
  (13.26) (5.88) (12.34) (6.41) 
      
Period  (t)  1.652**  -0.312 1.15* -2.008 
 (0.567)  (2.894)  (0.4602)  (2.28) 
 (2.91)  (-0.11)  (2.5)  (-0.88) 
      
Value  0.383*** 0.444*** 0.337*** 0.437*** 
 (0.037)  (0.07)  (0.0358)  (0.063) 
  (10.3)  (6.35) (9.4) (6.94) 
      
Treatment 2  -19.984***  -8.44  -27.74  -30.04 
 (5.968)  (10.55)  (36.396)  (46.35) 
 (-3.35)  (-0.8)  (-0.76)  (-0.65) 
      
Treatment 3  -0.168  8.73  2.681  5.889 
  (5.96) (10.538)  (36.36) (46.33) 
 (-0.03)  (0.83)  (0.07)  (0.13) 
      
No.  of  observations  3940 1328 3940 1328 
Wald Chi-squared/F-
statistic 
34.38 11.23 95.07 49.75 
Significance level  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.0000 
R-squared  (overall)  0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
The first number in brackets is the standard error; the second number in brackets is the t or z-statistic. 
*** Significant at 1% 
** Significant at 5% 
* Significant at 10% 
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Table 17: Estimation models for seller offers 
  OLS regression  Random effects estimation 
  All periods  Last five 
periods 
All periods  Last five 
periods 
Constant 892.28***  788.153***  831.98***  758.36*** 
 (28.29)  (44.413)  (29.176)  (41.75) 
  (31.54) (17.75) (28.52) (18.16) 
      
Period (t)  -5.286***  0.833  -5.199***  0.978 
  (0.46)  (1.68) (0.422) (1.51) 
  (-11.46) (0.5) (-12.31)  (0.65) 
      
Cost  0.215*** 0.241*** 0.275*** 0.274*** 
  (0.029) (0.039) (0.028) (0.036) 
  (7.38) (6.14) (9.93) (7.59) 
      
Treatment 2  21.109***  18.066***  14.36  9.55 
 (4.85)  (6.425)  (15.71)  (13.844) 
  (4.35) (2.81) (0.91) (0.69) 
      
Treatment 3  -9.620**  -7.8  -10.31  -11.489 
  (4.814) (6.373) (15.72) (13.82) 
 (-2.00)  (-1.22)  (-0.66)  (-0.83) 
      
No.  of  observations  3537 1173 3537 1173 
Wald Chi-squared/F-
statistic 
66.34 18.7  263.99  63.09 
Significance level  0.000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
R-squared  (overall)  0.07 0.06 0.07 0.06 
The first number in brackets is the standard error; the second number in brackets is the z-statistic. 
*** Significant at 1% 
** Significant at 5% 
* Significant at 10% 
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Treatment 1- water market Treatment 2 - water market with salinity tax
Treatment 3 - water market with salinity levy Treatment 1 - Predicted price (upper end point)
Treatment 1 - Predicted price (lower end point) Treatment 2 &3 - Predicted price (upper end point) 
Treatment 2&3 - Predicted price (lower end point)
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Figure 3: Average transaction quantity across all sessions for all treatments 
 




































































Treatment 1 - water market  Treatment 2 - water market with salinity tax
Treatment 3 - water market with salinity levy Treatment 1 - Predicted quantity 
Treatment 2&3 - Predicted quantity   44


























































Treatment 1 - water market Treatment 2 - water market + optimal tax
Treatment 3 - water market + salt levy Predicted buyer surplus - Treatment 1
Predicted buyer surplus - Treatment 2 & 3
 
 



























































Treatment 1 - water market Treatment 2 - water market + optimal tax
Treatment 3 - water market + salt levy Predicted seller surplus - Treatment 1
Predicted seller surplus - Treatment 2 & 3
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Treatment 1 - water market Treatment 2 - water market + optimal tax
Treatment 3 - water market + salt levy Predicted Surplus -Treatment 1
Predicted surplus - Treatment 2 & 3  46
Experiment instructions (Treatment 3, The Salinity Levy) 
  Buyer___________     Seller_____________ 
Introduction 
This is an experiment in the economics of decision making. The instructions are simple and if 
you follow them carefully and make good decisions you will earn money that will be paid to you 
at the end of the experiment. All earnings on your computer screens are in Experimental Dollars. 
These Experimental Dollars will be converted to real Dollars at the end of the experiment, at a 
rate of ________Experimental Dollars = 1 real Dollar. Everyone starts with 2000 Experimental 
Dollars (which is worth ______real Dollars), and your additional earnings are added to this 
starting amount. 
We are going to conduct a set of markets in which you will be a participant in a sequence of 
market trading periods. Attached to these instructions you will find a sheet labelled Personal 
Record Sheet, which will help you keep track of your earnings based on the decisions you might 
make. You are not to reveal this information to anyone. It is your own private information. 
During each market period you will be free to buy or sell units as you choose. Buyers earn 
money from redeeming any purchased units at a known redemption amount from the 
experimenter. Sellers earn money from selling units that cost a known amount. You will be 
either a buyer or a seller in today’s experiment, and you will remain in this role throughout the 
experiment. This experiment has five sellers and five buyers. 
 
Buyers 
Redemption is like a resale to the experimenter at a set price. If you are a buyer, your computer 
screen includes Redemption Values written on the left side—one value for each unit you might 
buy. See Figure 1.  
•  If you buy a unit during the trading period, your earnings from that unit are, 
o  Earnings in experimental dollars = (redemption value) – (purchase price)  
•  When deciding to make an offer to buy or accept a seller’s offer to sell it is important to 
take note of the sellers' taxes. Sellers' taxes are listed in the box in the middle of your 
screen. (You have also been given a hardcopy of the sellers' taxes.) If you buy from a 
seller with a tax you must pay the tax (all taxes accrue to the experimenter.) 
If you buy a unit during the trading period from a seller with a tax, your earnings on that unit are, 
•  Earnings in experimental dollars = (redemption value) - (purchase price + tax)  
•  In some cases a buyer may not be allowed to buy from a given seller. If there is a seller 
that you are not allowed to buy from, then the seller will be displayed on the top left of 
your screen in red. If you can buy from all sellers then this information is not displayed 
on your screen. 
•  Your total earnings in experimental dollars will be updated immediately after a purchase 
on the left side of your computer screen, above your redemption values, and are labelled 
"Current Profits this Period".  
•  The number of units you have bought so far this period is shown on the left side of your 
computer screen above current profits. The yellow bar on the left side of your computer 
screen also highlights the unit you are currently trying to buy. Please pay careful attention 
to the number of units you have bought so far this period, since that information is useful 
when assessing the redemption value of the next unit you buy. 
•  Notice that if you pay more for a unit than its redemption value then you suffer a loss in 
earnings on that unit. If you are buying from a seller who has a tax and you pay more for 
a unit than its redemption value minus the tax then you will suffer a loss in earnings on 
that unit. If you do not buy any units in a period then your earnings are zero for that 
period. Your redemption values may be different from the values of other buyers.  
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Sellers 
Sellers incur a per-unit cost when they sell a unit. If you are a seller, your computer screen 
displays your costs on the left side—one cost value for each unit you might sell. See Figure 2.  
•  If you sell a unit during the trading period, your earnings on that unit are,   
o  Earnings in experimental dollars = (sale price of unit) – (cost of unit). 
•  Your total earnings will be updated immediately after a sale on the left side of your 
computer screen, above your costs, and are labelled Current Profits this Period.  
•  The number of units you have sold so far this period is shown on the left side of your 
computer screen above current profits. The yellow bar on the left side of your computer 
screen also highlights the unit you are currently trying to sell. Please pay careful attention 
to the number of units you have sold so far this period, since that information is useful 
when assessing the cost of the next unit you sell. 
•  Some sellers have taxes. You have been given a hardcopy of the taxes for each seller. If 
you have a tax, then a buyer will have to pay the tax if she wants to buy your unit. (All 
taxes accrue to the experimenter.) 
•  Some sellers are not allowed to sell to some buyers. If you cannot trade with a buyer, 
then that buyer is shown in red at the top left of your screen. If you can trade with all 
buyers then this information is not shown on your screen. 
•  Notice that if a unit costs more than the amount for which you sell it then you suffer a 
loss in earnings on that unit. If you do not sell any units in a period then your earnings are 
zero for that period. Importantly, You do not incur the cost of a unit unless you sell that 
unit. Your costs may be different from the costs of other sellers.  
 
How to Buy and Sell 
Each trading period will be open for trading for 5 minutes; the time left in the period is shown on 
the upper right of the trading screen.  
•  At any time during the period, any buyer is free to make an offer to buy a unit at a price 
they choose; likewise, any seller is free to make an offer to sell a unit at a price they 
choose.  
•  Also at any time during the period, any buyer is free to buy at the best offer price 
specified by a seller, and any seller is free to sell at the best offer price specified by the 
buyers. 
You will enter offer prices and accept prices to execute transactions using your computer. Figure 
1 shows the market trading screen seen by buyers. Figure 2 shows the market trading screen seen 
by sellers.  
 
Buyers 
•  Submit offers to buy using the "Price" box in the upper centre of the screen, and then 
clicking on the "Make Offer" button (DO NOT PRESS ENTER, you must click the 
‘Make Offer’ button to submit an offer).  
•  Choose which sellers you want to make the offer to by checking and unchecking the 
boxes next to the sellers’ names. If all boxes are checked then you make the offer to all 
sellers. If you uncheck a box then the offer is not made to the unchecked seller(s). 
•  Buyers' offers to buy are displayed at the top right of your screen. All new offers to buy 
must be higher than the current highest buy offer.  
•  Buyers observe seller’s offers to sell on the lower right part of their computer screen. 
Sellers’ offers are displayed including any tax you must pay. 
•  An accept button will appear next to the seller’s offer. If you want to accept this offer you 
click on the accept button next to the offer you want to accept.   48
•  If a seller’s offer is shown in red, then you cannot trade with this seller. No accept button 
will appear next this seller's offers. 
•  The previous trading prices in the current period are displayed in the "Sold Prices" list in 
the bottom centre of your computer screen. 
 
Sellers 
•  Submit offer prices using the "Price" box in the lower centre of the screen, and then 
clicking on the "Make Offer" button (DO NOT PRESS ENTER, you must click the 
‘Make Offer’ button to submit an offer).  
•  This offer price is immediately displayed on all traders’ computers on the lower right part 
of the screen, labelled "Sellers' Offers."  
•  If you already have a Sell Offer displayed in the current period, then new sell offers you 
submit must be lower than your current sell offer. (Note. Your new offer price does not 
have to be lower than other sellers' best price, but it must be lower than your best offer 
price.) 
•  Sellers observe the Buy Offers made by buyers on the upper right part of their computer 
screen. They accept the best (that is, highest offer price) by simply clicking the "Accept" 
button on the right side of their computer screen. This results in an immediate trade at 
that price. 
•  Some sellers cannot trade with some buyers. If an offer price is from a buyer you cannot 
trade with the accept button will not appear on your screen. 
 
 Recording Rules 
•  Your end of period earnings (in experimental dollars) equal the sum of all profits 
(positive and negative) on the units that you trade.  
•  This total will be updated continuously on the left side of your computer screen, and it 
will be displayed briefly on a screen at the end of a trading period.  
•  At the end of a trading period you should write down these earnings in column (2) of 
your Personal Record Sheet. Keep track of your cumulative profits in column (3), by 
adding the column (2) period profit to the previous period’s cumulative profit. At the end 
of the experiment you will divide your cumulative profit by the conversion rate to 
determine you total earnings in real Dollars. 
 
Summary 
•  Seller earnings on a sold item = sale price of item – cost of item 
•  Buyer earnings on a purchased item = redemption value of item – price paid for item 
•  Some sellers have taxes. If a buyer buys from a seller with a tax then the buyer earnings 
on the purchased item = redemption value – tax – price paid for item. 
•  At any time during the 5-minute trading period, buyers submit offers to buy or accept 
sellers’ offers to sell an item. Sellers submit offers to sell or accept buyers’ offers to buy 
an item. 
•  Some buyers cannot buy from some sellers. 
•  Some sellers cannot sell to some buyers 
•  New offers to buy must be higher than all existing offers to buy. 
•  A seller's new offer to sell must be lower than his/her existing offer to sell. 
•  Profits should be recorded on Record Sheets at the end of each period. 
We will conduct _____training periods. Are there any questions now before we begin the 
experiment?    49

























Example Seller Screen 
   50






Profit this Period 
(displayed on your computer 











0   Start  at  2000 








3   
 
 
4   
 
 
5   
 
 
6   
 
 
7   
 
 
8   
 
 
9   
 
 
10    
11    
12    
13    
14    
15    
16    
Conversion Rate: 
 
Divide by:   
  Converted Total:   
 